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ABSTRACT
StoCharts have been proposed as a UML statechart exten-
sion for performance and dependability evaluation, and have
been applied in the context of train radio reliability assess-
ment to show the principal tractability of realistic cases with
this approach. In this paper, we extend on this bare feasibil-
ity result in two important directions. First, we sketch the
cornerstones of a mechanizable translation of StoCharts to
MoDeST. The latter is a process algebra-based formalism
supported by the Motor/Mo¨bius tool tandem. Second, we
exploit this translation for a detailed analysis of the train
radio case study.
Keywords
UML, stochastic systems, concurrency, tool support, relia-
bility, wireless communication, European Train Control Sys-
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1. INTRODUCTION
The UML is pervading many challenging engineering areas
including real-time and embedded system design. Embed-
ded systems designers are usually facing various challenges
if they strive for systems with predictable quality of service
(QoS). Most QoS aspects of current embedded systems are
time-related features and properties, and are of stochastic
nature. While in principle the UML provides the right in-
gredients to model discrete event dynamic systems, it lacks
support for stochastic process modeling.
Together with Katoen [18] we have proposed a QoS-orien-
ted extension of UML statechart diagrams,StoChart,which
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enhances the basic formalism with two distinguished fea-
tures. One enhancement allows state transitions to select
probabilistically out of different effects, much like the rolling
of a die can have one out of six effects, determined proba-
bilistically. The second extension provides the “after” oper-
ator of statecharts with a stochastic interpretation, allowing
the use of arbitrary probability distributions for modeling,
such as EXP[10 min] for a negative exponential distribution
with a mean of 10 minutes, or UNIF[10 h, 15 h] for a uniform
distribution in the interval from 10 to 15 hours. The result-
ing statecharts dialect is called StoCharts, and contains
UML statechart diagrams as a subset.
To make StoCharts a useful tool in QoS modeling, and
to support trustworthy model-based QoS prediction, they
possess a rigid formal semantics [16]. This semantics com-
bines concepts from timed, stochastic and probabilistic au-
tomata [1, 7, 25]. In order to associate a stochastic inter-
pretation to collaborative collections of statecharts embed-
ded in arbitrary environments, StoCharts are equipepd
with a compositional semantics, which uses concepts from
Input/Output (I/O) automata [20]. The semantics associ-
ated with StoCharts is based on the requirements-level
semantics of Eshuis and Wieringa [11].
The examples we studied with StoCharts so far [18, 17]
show the principal modeling convenience of the formalism,
but they also show that the lack of tool support is hampering
its application. While drawing tools for UML statechart di-
agrams and StoCharts are at hand (e.g. TCM [10]), anal-
ysis tools which can digest StoCharts designs are missing.
Therefore we have decided to invest in a tool environment
for StoCharts. Instead of starting a new tool development,
we decided to bridge to the ongoing activities in the context
of the Motor tool [4]. Motor is linked to the Mo¨bius tool
set [9] for discrete event simulation-based analysis, and it
uses the modeling and specification language MoDeST as
an input language. MoDeST is a formal language to de-
scribe stochastic timed systems [8], equipped with a rigid
formal semantics. The functional core of MoDeST can be
considered as a simple process algebra enriched with some
convenient language constructs, and a C-like notation. This
core language is enriched with several modeling concepts tai-
lored to model timed and/or stochastic systems. MoDeST
has been successfully used in a number of nontrivial case
studies, see for example [5].
The semantic basis of StoCharts and MoDeST is simi-
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Figure 1: Example StoChart
lar, since both map onto variations of timed and stochastic
automata. Thus, at least in principle, it appears feasible
to define a sound translational semantics which maps Sto-
Charts designs onto MoDeST code. The latter can then be
fed into the Motor/Mo¨bius tool-tandem. However, several
features of statecharts, such as border-crossing transitions,
pose challenges to this semantics. This observation moti-
vates the work reported in this paper, where we explore the
most important elements of StoCharts and discuss their
counterparts in MoDeST. The translational semantics is
developed by means of a recent exemplary case study [17],
which uses all intricate concepts of statecharts and Sto-
Charts. This allows us to identify subtle issues. Further-
more, the concrete translation for this particular case allows
us to use Motor and Mo¨bius for a detailed parametric
analysis of the case study.
The case study focuses on a safety critical fragment of the
European Train Control System (ETCS) standard. This
standard aims at ensuring interoperability of European rail-
way systems in the future. Communication among ETCS
components (trains, trackside equipment etc.) will be based
on mobile communication using GSM-R, an adaptation of
the GSM protocol to railway applications. The safe and
efficient operation of ETCS is, of course, of prime impor-
tance. The specifications of GSM-R and of ETCS contain
various QoS requirements such as “a connection must be es-
tablished within 5 seconds with 95 % probability”. Due to the
architecture of ETCS, on-board and trackside data process-
ing as well as the radio communication link are crucial fac-
tors in ensuring the ETCS requirements. In order to study
this issue, we recently developed a StoChart model [17].
Albeit being simple, the StoChart-model enabled us to
identify bounds on the distance between consecutive trains
on a track, under which crucial QoS requirements of ETCS
are still satisfied. To arrive at these results, the StoChart
collection was manually translated into a simulation model.
This model in turn was fed into the tool ProVer [26] which
implements a variation of discrete event simulation. In this
paper, we instead translate the StoChart-model into Mo-
DeST, and use the tool combination Motor and Mo¨bius
to perform a much more detailed and parametric analysis,
which (as a sanity check) is still consistent with the results
obtained via ProVer. A particular aspect of this detailed
analysis lies in the fact that we exercise a design-by-contract
approach in a quantitative setting, allowing interesting in-
sight into the general behaviour of the ETCS system.
In summary the contribution of this paper is threefold.
(1) The paper sets the formal grounds for a sound and mech-
anizable translation from StoCharts to MoDeST, devel-
oped by means of the ETCS case. (2) The translation en-
ables a mechanic and thus more detailed analysis of the
ETCS case, owed to the power of the Mo¨bius tool inter-
face and the simulation engine. (3) The paper sheds light
on the contractual guarantees the system can provide, and
their roots in the contractual guarantees given by the GSM-
R specification.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 introduces the mod-
eling formalisms that are used in this paper. Subsection 2.1
introduces StoCharts, briefly touching upon semantic is-
sues, and Subsection 2.2 introduces the MoDeST language.
Section 3 contains the description and modeling of the ETCS
case study in both StoCharts and MoDeST. The analysis
is presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses lessons
learned from this case study and concludes the paper.
2. THE MODELING LANGUAGES
2.1 StoCharts
This section gives a brief overview of StoCharts and
reviews the underlying semantic model. We refer to [18, 16]
for a thorough discussion of the StoChart formalism and
a comparison to statechart diagrams.
Abstract syntax. A basic StoChart consists of
• a finite set of Nodes1 arranged in a tree structure, as for
statechart diagrams. Nodes are of type ‘basic’ (leaves
of the tree), ‘and’ , or ‘or’. Each or -node has a distin-
guished, initial child node.
• a finite set of Events, as for statechart diagrams.
1The UML specification for statechart diagrams [23] actu-
ally speaks of states, but we prefer to call them otherwise
because the system can be in more than one node at the
same time.
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Later on, we will also use pseudo events. A pseudo
event is an expression of the form after(F ), where F :
[0,∞) → [0, 1] is a so-called cumulative distribution
function, i. e., a function to express a stochastic delay:
F (t) is the probability that the delay is at most t time
units.
Some simple cumulative distribution functions are de-
noted as follows: DET[t] means a deterministic delay
of time t; EXP[t] means an exponentially distributed
delay with mean time t.
• a finite set of (typed) variables or attributes together
with an initial valuation, assigning initial values to the
variables.
• a finite set of P-Edges, corresponding to the transitions
of a statechart diagram. A P-edge consists of a set
of source nodes, a triggering event or pseudo event,
a guard, which jointly describe when the P-edge can
be taken. The reaction is described by a probability
distribution over pairs which consist of a set of actions
and a set of target nodes.
Drawing a StoChart. A StoChart is drawn almost like
a UML statechart diagram. Nodes are drawn as rectangles
with rounded corners; the children of a node are drawn in-
side its boundary. Children of an and -node partition the
node by dashed lines. The initial node is indicated by an
arrow pointing from a small dot to the initial node.
A (nontrivial) P-edge is graphically depicted in two parts:
an arrow labeled with an event and a guard directed to a
P-pseudonode (drawn as P©) from which several arrows to
target nodes emanate, each labeled with a probability and
an action set (similar to a compound edge, where targets
are chosen according to a condition).
A trivial P-edge (where probability 1 is assigned to a
unique action set and target nodes set) can be drawn like
a transition in a statechart diagram: a single arrow labeled
with event, guard and actions.
Intuitive semantics. Like a statechart diagram, a Sto-
Chart is always in some state which consists of one or
several nodes: if an and -node is part of the state, all of
its children are in the state. If an or -node is part of the
state, exactly one of its children is so.
A P-edge is enabled if all its source nodes are part of the
current state, its guard holds, and either its event happens
or the delay associated with its after operator expires. The
system selects as many enabled P-edges as possible for exe-
cution (a choice between conflicting edges is often resolved
by a priority scheme) and resolves the discrete probabilis-
tic choices. Once the selected edges are taken, their source
nodes are left, their actions are executed, and their target
nodes are entered. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
transitions are instantaneous.
The new state is completed to satisfy the rules stated
above about children of and - and or -nodes; if no edge spec-
ifies which child of an or -node is to be entered, the initial
child is chosen.
On entering a node with an outgoing (P-)edge labeled
with an after(F ) operation, a sample is taken from distri-
bution F and a timer is set accordingly. The corresponding
outgoing edge becomes enabled once the timer expires.
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function for the
transmission delay
Example StoChart. Figure 1 shows a small example of a
StoChart. It is a model for a fragment of the transmission
medium in the ETCS system. The transmission medium
reacts to transmitting a message (indicated by event trans-
mit) by generating a reception some time later (indicated by
action receive). The delay is required to be [12]
• at most 0.5 seconds with 95 % probability;
• at most 1.2 seconds with 99 % probability (i. e. more
than 0.5, but ≤ 1.2 seconds with 4 % probability);
• at most 2.4 seconds with 99.99 % probability (i. e. more
than 1.2, but ≤ 2.4 seconds with 0.99 % probability).
The StoChart models the worst case: the time between the
event transmit and the action receive is exactly 0.5 seconds
with probability 0.95, exactly 0.5 + 0.7 = 1.2 seconds with
probability 0.05 ·0.8 = 0.04, and exactly 0.5+0.7+1.2 = 2.4
seconds with probability 0.05·0.2·0.99 = 0.0099; the message
is lost with the remaining probability. This behavior is mod-
eled by three after operators, each with a deterministic delay.
Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding cumulative distribu-
tion function: the solid line indicates the required minimum
probability that the communication succeeds within a given
time (in seconds), as modelled in the StoChart. In real-
ity, the communication delay may be shorter, for example
as indicated by the dotted line in figure 2.
The above may be interrupted by a so-called handover,
where the connection between the train and the radio block
center is handed over from one radio cell to another. As
radio cells may have different sizes, we cannot model this
by a deterministic delay. We will argue later that the train
moves from one radio cell to another every 50 seconds on
average. If only the average of a stochastic distribution is
known, the most general stochastic distribution that can be
chosen is the exponential one. A cell handover lasts 0.3
seconds. When a handover starts, the current transmission
gets lost.
Semantic model. The formal semantics of StoCharts [18]
is defined in terms of an extension of labeled transition sys-
tems. These transition systems are equipped with timers to
model stochastic delays, and with a set of actions to model
system activities. The use of timers in transition systems is
similar, though not equivalent to the use of clocks in Mo-
DeST and e. g., timed automata [1, 19]. While clocks run
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forward at the same pace and are always reset to 0, our
timers are initialized by sampling a stochastic distribution
and run backwards. On the other hand, our timers are al-
ways checked for expiration (i. e., is the timer equal to zero?),
while clocks can be checked against complex conditions.
Input and output actions are distinguished to allow for the
composition of transition systems, like in I/O-automata [20].
Three types of transition relations are used: input transi-
tions, output transitions, and delay transitions, the latter
being enabled once a timer expires. Whereas input and de-
lay transitions are standard ternary relations, the output
transition relation is probabilistic. The resulting model is
called a stochastic I/O-automaton (Iosa, for short).
A Iosa is a specific semantic structure that contains ex-
actly the ingredients needed for stochart semantics [18]. Gen-
eralised Semi-Markov Processes (GSMP) are a frequently
found model for stochastic processes, and often, a Iosa can
be translated to a GSMP. However, GSMPs do not allow
nondeterministic choice, and they also restrict the allowed
stochastic distributions so as to reduce the probability that
two timers expire at the same moment (introducing non-
determinism again) to zero. The Iosa associated with the
StoCharts in our case study does not contain any nonde-
terminism.
2.2 MoDeST
MoDeST is a formal language to describe stochastic timed
systems [8], equipped with a rigid formal semantics. The
functional core of MoDeST can be considered as a sim-
ple process algebra enriched with some convenient language
constructs. The syntax resembles that of the programming
language C and the modeling language Promela [15]. Data
modularization concepts and exception handling mechanisms
have been adopted from modern object-oriented program-
ming languages such as Java. Process algebraic constructs
have been strongly influenced by FSP (Finite State Pro-
cesses [21]), a simple, elegant calculus that is aimed at edu-
cational purposes.
This core language is enriched with several modeling con-
cepts tailored to model timed and/or stochastic systems.
We highlight three particular semantic concepts which are
well-established in the context of real-time and stochastic
discrete event systems:
• Probabilistic branching is a way to include quantitative
information about the likelihood of choice alternatives.
• Clocks are a means to represent real time and to spec-
ify the dynamics of a model in relation to a certain
time or time interval, represented by a specific value
of a clock.
• Random variables are often used to give quantitative
information about the likelihood of a certain event to
happen after or within a certain time interval.
The MoDeST language allows one to specify processes, and
to compose them in parallel using a ‘par ’ operator. Pro-
cesses can manipulate data variables by assignments. Data
variables are typed and must be declared, and the point of
declaration determines their scope. In particular, they may
be local to a process, or global, in which case they are shared
between all processes. A particular type of variable which
can be declared is the clock type. Clocks can be read like
an ordinary float variable, but advance their value linearly
to system time. All clocks run at the same speed. Clocks
can only be set to zero. The language provides generic con-
structs to sample values from a set of predefined probability
distributions. For instance, ‘xd = Uniform(10, 20)’ assigns a
sample from the uniform distribution on the interval [10, 20]
to the variable ‘xd’. Other types of distributions are, e. g.,
Exponential(rate) and Normal(mean,var).
Apart from manipulating data, processes can interact with
other parallel processes (or the environment) by means of
actions. Their occurrence within a process can be guarded
by a ‘when(.)’ clause, specifying a enabledness condition.
In particular, the boolean expression in a ‘when(.)’ clause
may refer to clock values. In that case, an action may be
enabled as soon as the when(.) condition becomes true (and
no other action becomes enabled earlier). We assume a max-
imal progress semantics. – Processes in the body of a ‘par ’
construct perform actions and assignments independently
from each other, except that common (non-local) actions
need to be executed synchronously, a` la CSP [14].
MoDeST provides means to raise exceptions inside a try
block and to handle them. When an exception is raised,
process control is handed over to the exception handler con-
tained in a catch block. Another, standard way of handing
over process control is by a simple process call. Upon termi-
nation of the called process, the calling process gains back
control, like in an ordinary procedure call.
The ‘alt’ construct is used to specify choice between differ-
ent possible behaviors. In general, this choice is made non-
deterministically. A variant thereof is the ‘palt ’ construct,
which provides a weighted probabilistic choice, where each
weight has the form :w:, with w a positive real number. The
‘do’ keyword indicates a repetitive behavior. Upon termina-
tion of the body of this construct, the body is restarted,
until a ‘break’ is encountered.
As an example of a small MoDeST code, the following
fragment describes a process C 1 which waits for five time
units prior to randomly selecting between continuing as pro-
cess C 2 (5 % of the cases) or performing an action c (95 %
of the cases).
1 proc C_1 ()
2 {
3 clock x=0;
4 when (x==5)
5 tau; palt
6 {
7 :5: C_2();
8 :95: c;
9 }
10 }
In this fragment, the action ’tau’ stands for an internal step,
in particular ’tau’ is a local action which is not attainable
for synchronisation.
3. THE ETCS SYSTEM AND ITS MODEL-
ING
3.1 Informal Description of ETCS system
This section briefly introduces into the high-speed train
radio signaling case study we considered [17], inspired by
earlier work by Zimmermann and Hommel [27].
European Train Control System. The upcoming Euro-
pean Train Control Systems (ETCS) serves as a unifying
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standard of many European railways. It is promoted by
the European Union to simplify access to and cross-border
traffic in between different national rail networks. The main
constituent is a uniform communication infrastructure across
Europe. This communication infrastructure is based on
GSM-R, which is an adaptation of the well-known GSM
protocol for wireless communications to railway specific ap-
plications.
ETCS levels. ETCS knows multiple levels to enable grad-
ual migration from the current systems. In our case study,
we will only consider level 3, the highest level defined. On
this level, all important information is exchanged between
trains and trackside coordination units, so called radio block
centers (RBCs) via GSM-R-based radio communication. In
particular, a train needs to receive so-called movement au-
thorities (MAs) from the RBC in order to continuously run
at high speed. These MAs grant the train exclusive access
to some physical track block, and are sent by the RBC if it
is certain that the preceding train has moved ahead in its
entirety. To assure this, ETCS level 3 requires that trains
are equipped with an onboard devices which check train in-
tegrity. The integrity status and the current position are re-
ported from train to RBC at regular intervals. This enables
the RBC to declare the track behind the train clear with vir-
tually no delay, which in turn is a requirement for so-called
moving-block operation, where the track block granted ex-
clusively to a specific train is not a fixed unit of the track
between two signals, but instead moves with the train along
the track.
This moving-block operation is expected to reduce the
headway, i. e., the time between the passage of consecutive
trains at some point of the track, well below 3 minutes,
which is a typical headway in fixed block operation. The
minimal headway is the sum of several delays (assuming
trains running at 300 km/h): a delay needed for train in-
tegrity check (< 4 seconds), the communication delay itself,
and a delay that reflects certain physical distances: (i) train
length (typical value: 400 m), (ii) braking distance (about
2500 m), (iii) margin for position measurement errors (5 %).
The latter is at most 50 m, if Eurobalises (devices that tell
their exact position to a train passing over it) are positioned
no more than 1 km apart. For simplicity, we assume that
these distances sum up to 3000 m. The train travels this
distance in 36 seconds. Thus, with instant communication,
40 seconds would be the ultimate lower bound on the head-
way between consecutive trains.
In the case study, we have a closer look at the reliability
of communication needed for moving-block operation, un-
der realistic perturbations: GSM-R may fail to establish a
connection; a connection may get degraded or lost; during
handover from one GSM radio cell to another messages may
get delayed. Under normal circumstances, the train reports
the safe position of its head and tail at fixed intervals, for
example every 5 seconds. What happens if one or several
of these reports get lost? On the other hand, MAs need to
be received by the train at similar intervals. What is the
probability that the train misses a movement authority?
To address these questions, we study an initial model
which is based on the known guarantees provided by GSM-
R, i. e., we assume that the GSM-R network functions as
specified in the Euroradio specification [12, 27]. Later we
will vary some of these assumptions. In particular, we as-
sume:
• The delay to establish a GSM-R connection is at most
5 seconds with 95 % and at most 7.5 seconds with
99.9 % probability. Delays of more than 7.5 seconds
are regarded as connection establishment errors.
• The end-to-end delay of a (short) message is at most
0.5 sec with 95 %, at most 1.2 sec with 99 % and at
most 2.4 sec with 99.99 % probability (see the illustra-
tion in figure 2).
• Handover takes place whenever the train passes from
one GSM radio cell to another. As ETCS is intended
to work with train speeds up to 500 km/h, we take
at first a pessimistic assumption on the time between
handovers. The mean distance between handovers is
specified to be 7 km; this leads to a mean time be-
tween cell handovers of 50 seconds. The communica-
tion break during handover lasts at most 0.3 sec.
• From time to time, the train may pass an area where
communication is degraded and frequent transmission
errors occur. These periods are more than 7 seconds
apart with 95 % probability. A degraded period is re-
quired to be shorter than 1 second with 95 % proba-
bility.
• A connection loss has a probability ≤ 10−4 per hour.
It shall be detected within 1 sec.
With respect to the train-specific behavior, we adhere to the
following assumptions as put forward in [13, 24]:
• A passenger train completes an integrity check within
4 seconds; it reports the outcome and its position to
the RBC at most once in 5 seconds.
• A typical train trip has a duration of 1 hour.
We view all the above properties as constraints to be met
by the environment in which a level 3 train operates. This
view can be seen as an application of the design-by-contract
paradigm [22, 3], in the sense that the ETCS system is re-
quired to work properly if these constraints are met (or out-
balanced). The question then remains what specific guaran-
tees can be distilled from these assumptions. We intend to
check whether it is possible that trains run at 300 km/h with
only a small headway, for example 1 minute. In particular,
we want to find answers to the following questions:
• The probability p that a message is transmitted suc-
cessfully has to be at least 99.95 %. This figure is
based on the availability requirement of [12]. As parts
of the communication delay are distributed stochas-
tically, the success probability depends on the time
frame t we allow as maximal communication delay.
Recall that the minimal headway with (hypothetic) in-
stant communication is 40 seconds. With a 1 minute
headway in mind, the question is: Is the probability
p ≥ 99.95 % for t = 20 seconds?
• Even if 20 seconds lead to p being in the range required
above (≥ 99.95), it is still not obvious that this also
enables multiple trains to run at a headway of 1 minute
during a complete trip. We therefore also consider
the question: What is the probability that two trains
(with a small headway) run for a full hour without ever
braking or stopping?
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3.2 The StoChart model
In our recent paper [17], we have modeled the ETCS case
study using StoCharts. We construct the models used in
the experiment from two components: a sender and a re-
ceiver. In Section 4, we will see how the sender and receiver
are composed to answer the questions above.
Figure 3 shows the sender model for a train. In node
Reporting position, a position report is prepared every 5 sec-
onds, indicated by the after edge with a deterministic delay.
It is sent as soon as possible, if the sender assumes there
is a connection to the receiver. The node Connection status
just stores the information the sender has about the connec-
tion: it is either disconnected (the initial node, where it tries
to establish a connection by sending event try), connected
normally or involved in a cell handover.
There are several causes for delay and stochasticity in the
communication protocol between sender and receiver. We
have decided to incorporate these delays into the receiver
model, while the sender model is reactive, waiting for feed-
back from the receiver. For example, to model the estab-
lishment phase for a radio connection, the receiver model
includes after(. . .) operators and sends a message back to
the sender system when the connection is established. Al-
ternatively, we could have split the communication charac-
teristics from the receiver, and let the sender and receiver
interact through a transmission medium submodel.
Figure 4 shows the receiver model together with the de-
lays. When the sender tries to establish a connection with
the receiver (by sending event try), the connection establish-
ment delay starts. It is guaranteed to be at most 5 seconds
with 95 % probability and at most 7.5 seconds with another
4.9 %. We have modeled this guarantee using two determin-
istic delays, one of length 5 sec (on the edge leaving node
connecting 1), the other one of length 2.5. Alternatively,
we could have modelled it using a single more complex dis-
tribution, similar to the cumulative distribution function in
figure 2.
The node correct contains as a subchart the example Sto-
Chart of figure 1; this is indicated by the @. This subchart
models the communication delay and cell handover.
To this basic model of normal operation, we have added
two more possibilities of perturbations: (i) Periods of fre-
quent transmission errors may occur (as described above),
making it impossible to correct errors in the received bit-
stream. In our model, this is reflected by node error burst.
Both the beginning and the end of the error burst period are
modeled by exponential delays, as the errors occur stochas-
tically. The mean times of the relevant delays are chosen as
to meet the requirements given above. (ii) All other failure
types are subsumed under connection loss, which is required
to happen at most 10−4 times per hour. We have modeled
this by an exponential delay with an average of 104 hours.
The sender notices the connection loss with a delay; this is
modeled by waiting in node undetected connection loss for
1 second.
3.3 The MoDeST model and translation issues
The basic recipe for translating the StoChart model into
MoDeST code is not difficult.
Overall structure. Based on the semantic model of Sto-
Charts (Section 2.1), we model the collection of StoCharts
as a parallel composition of processes in MoDeST in a way
that each substate of an and -state is a separate parallel Mo-
DeST process. So, for example, the sender StoChart is
translated to two parallel processes.
1 proc Sender ()
2 { :: Reporting_Position ()
3 :: Connection_Status ()
4 }
The top-level view on the resulting code is as follows:
1 par
2 { :: Sender ()
3 :: Receiver ()
4 }
The communication between the StoChart-nodes on the
level of MoDeST processes is performed via shared vari-
ables in a straightforward fashion.
Individual processes. Each process in the translation is
generated in the following way. Each basic node of the Sto-
Chart is translated to a state in the automata view on Mo-
DeST. In this way we obtain a local transition system for
each and -substate of a StoChart. This transition system
can be directly encoded into MoDeST-code, because:
• MoDeST provides native support for nondeterminis-
tic and probabilistic choice.
• Drawing samples from arbitrary distributions is also
supported in MoDeST directly.
• The action synchronization mechanisms of MoDeST
and StoCharts are virtually the same, except that
the distinction between input and output is not made
in MoDeST.
• Time delays are modeled using clocks. For example,
the statement after(DET[5 sec]) is modeled as:
1 clock x=0;
2 when (x==5) ...
• Random delays such as after(EXP[5 sec]) are be mod-
eled as:
1 clock x=0;
2 float y=Exponential(1/5);
3 when (x==y) ...
4
• Each pair of StoChart input/output actions “a/b” is
translated into a sequence of MoDeST actions “a;b”.
In this way, the code example at the end of section 2.2 is
the translation of basic node “connecting 1” in figure 4 (after
renaming “C” into “connecting”).
In case the guard of a transition is a state predicate of
another process, we model it using shared memory commu-
nication mechanism. For instance, the translation of the
predicate “in(connected)” is contained in the following frag-
ment for node “Reporting position”.
1 process Reporting_Position()
2 { clock x=0;
3 when(x==5) tau {= x=0 =};
4 do{::par{::when (connected==1) transmit
5 ::when (x==5) tau {= x=0 =}
6 }
7 }
8 }
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Figure 4: The receiver model, including error models
In this code fragment, “connected” is a shared variable set
to 1 by the parallel process corresponding to the “Connec-
tion status” state. If this variable is set to 1, then the train
position report can be transmitted (the action “transmit”
is enabled). But this transmission only occurs if the par-
allel process for the receiver is able to communicate syn-
chronously by performing the same “transmit” action. Fur-
thermore, the code ensures that a report can be transmitted
every 5 seconds.
As an optimization, we transform tail recursion into “do”
loops, which are implemented more efficiently in MoDeST
than recursive process calls.
Border-crossing transitions. One of the main challenges
to overcome during the translation is posed by border-crossing
transitions characteristic for statecharts. To reflect their ef-
fect properly we use the exception mechanism of MoDeST
(cf. Section 2.2). We combine exceptions with parallelism
and obtain a powerful mechanism, somewhat similar to the
disrupt mechanism in LOTOS [6]. The abstract mechanism
looks as follows:
1 try{
2 par{::P()
3 ::disrupting_event1; throw exception_event1
4 }
5 }
6 catch exception_event1{
7 <do something>
8 }
In this example the “disrupting event1” can occur at any
state of process P() (because of the interleaving semantics
of parallel composition). As the result, the execution of P()
is aborted and control is transferred to the “catch” body.
In order to model the same behavior without exceptions,
one would have to add an alternative composition to every
state of process P(), which would lead to error-prone code
blowup.
We use this mechanism several times in the translation.
For example, the “Connection status” state is translated in
the following way:
1 process Connection_status()
2 { do{::
3 do{::action_try;
4 alt{:: connection_fails
5 :: connect {= connected=1 =}; break
6 }
7 };
8
9 // Connected
10 try{
11 par{::do{::h_start {= connected=0 =};
12 h_end {= connected=1 =}
13 }
14 :: detect_connection_loss {= connected=0 =};
15 throw retry
16 }
17 }
18 catch (retry){tau}
19 }
20 }
The whole process is an endless “do” loop that consists of
two parts: establishing a connection, and maintaining it (de-
tecting cell handovers and connection losses). The first part
19
is rather trivial: we try to establish a connection (action
“action try”), and then wait for the result. Once we get a
handshake by the “connect” action, we set the shared vari-
able “connected” to 1 and go to the second part; once we
get a handshake by “connection fails” action, we repeat the
“action try”.
The second part demonstrates the use of the exception
mechanism. We execute the process that checks for cell han-
dovers (actions “h start” and “h end”, which correspond to
cell handover start and end, respectively). At any state of
this process action “detect connection loss” may occur (be-
cause of the interleaving semantics of parallel composition).
After that the exception “retry” is thrown immediately.
In order to translate the receiver StoChart we need to
use several levels of exceptions, in the form of cascading
exceptions. The problem here is that the “normal flow”
of the receiver process can be disrupted by three types of
events:
• cell handover,
• error burst,
• undetected connection loss.
The priority of the disrupts is in the presented order, i. e. a
connection loss can interrupt both the cell handover and the
error burst procedures, and an error burst can interrupt a
cell handover. We use a cascading exception scheme, similar
to the following, to model this:
1 try{
2 par{::try{
3 par{::P()
4 ::disrupting_event1; throw exception_event1
5 }
6 }
7 catch exception_event1{
8 <do something1>
9 }
10 ::disrupting_event2; throw exception_event2
11 }
12 }
13 catch exception_event2{
14 <do something2>
15 }
Here we see that the inner try/catch construction (lines 2–
9) is identical to the one-level exception handling example
presented above.
On exit triggers. Yet another challenge lies in modeling
the “on exit” construction of StoCharts, especially in the
situation with exceptions. This is due to the fact that, un-
like in C++, there are neither destructors, nor automatic
destructor invocations in MoDeST. Therefore we propose
the following solution. We remember the fact that we have
to do an exit transition by setting a flag and check it when
we handle the exception. For example:
1 process Transmit_with_Cell_Handover()
2 { clock x; float y;
3 do{::
4 try{ tau {= y=Exponential(1.0/50), x=0 =};
5 par{::Transmit()
6 ::when(x==y) throw cell_handover
7 }
8 }
9 catch(cell_handover){
10 h_start {= x=0, handover=1 =};
11 when (x==0.3) h_end {= handover=0 =}
12 }
13 }
14 }
15
16 process Transmit_with_Cell_Handover_and_Error_Burst()
17 { clock x; float y;
18 do{::
19 try{ tau {= y=Exponential(1.0/136), x=0 =};
20 par{::Transmit_with_Cell_Handover()
21 ::when(x==y) throw error_burst
22 }
23 }
24 catch(error_burst){
25 alt{::when (handover==1)
26 h_end {= handover=0 =}
27 ::when (handover==0) tau
28 };
29 tau {= y=Exponential(1.0/0.33), x=0 =};
30 when (x==y) tau
31 }
32 }
33 }
In this example the first process sets the flag “handover”
whenever it is in the cell handover state (lines 10–11), and
the second process checks this flag, and executes “h end” if
needed (lines 25–26). This check should also be present in
all outer exception handling routines.
In this section we outlined the translation procedure based
on the ETCS example, which contains all important features
of StoCharts. This semantics-by-example still awaits a
rigid formal proof. The fact that the numerical analysis in
the following section yields consistent results gives a good
sign that such a proof can be achieved.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1 Tools
Our original case study [17] used the tool ProVer for
simulation-based analysis of a hand-crafted model of the
ETCS, derived from the StoChart design. ProVer is a
tool that uses discrete event simulation to estimate proba-
bilities of interesting system behaviours, similar to various
other tools for GSMP analysis. ProVer is, however, par-
ticular in the manner the behaviour-of-interest is specified
by the user. It allows to specify two types of requirements.
First, ProVer can estimate the probability with which cer-
tain path-based system requirements are satisfied by the
model. These requirements are stated as path properties
in the stochastic temporal logic CSL [2]. ProVer’s output
is then a likelihood (and an error estimate) with which the
path formula is estimated to be satisfied. Second, ProVer
can also be used similar to a model checker to verify whether
a CSL state property is met by the model. ProVer’s output
is then either “yes” or “no” (and a confidence).
The Motor/Mo¨bius tool tandem allows to perform dis-
crete event simulation of MoDeST specifications. During
the simulation the system time advances in variable steps,
as long as no activity is present. As a result we get an execu-
tion trace containing the time-stamped actions the system
performs. Different execution traces are different from each
other due to the difference in the random values drawn by
the tool in accordance to the probability distributions used
in the specification. In this way a sufficiently large number
of execution traces allows one to quantitatively estimate the
conditions under which certain actions occur in the system.
In this case study we estimated the distribution of time
delays between subsequent occurrences of “receive” actions
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Figure 5: Model for the first experiment
performed by the system. Therefore, from the execution
traces we distilled the time stamps of “receive” actions. Fur-
ther, we used a python script to analyze this list of time
stamps and to calculate the probability distributions for the
delays between consecutive “receive” actions.
We considered it as a very useful sanity-check to investi-
gate in how far the two resulting models (both derived via
manual transformation steps – though on different levels)
fed into different simulation infrastructures (ProVer and
Motor/Mo¨bius) lead to identical or diverging simulation
results. So, we made ProVer generate a file of runs in the
same format as the Motor/Mo¨bius output, and used the
same python script to analyze them. The results for the
combined use of ProVer and python are also provided
below, together with the results obtained via MoDeST.
4.2 First Experiment: Reliability of Commu-
nication
In a first setting, we investigate the communication reli-
ability. The model we use consists of a single sender (say,
a train) and a single receiver (say, a RBC), as shown in
figure 5 (in the syntax of a UML deployment diagram: in-
formally speaking, the 3D boxes represent hardware com-
ponents that run the software drawn as a box with handles
inside them. A line between hardware components indicates
a communication link.). The behaviors of train/sender and
RBC/receiver are as shown in the StoCharts. The train
generates a position report every 5 seconds and sends it off
to the RBC once it assumes the connection is working. We
have checked whether the communication is reliable enough,
depending on the delay until the reception of a position re-
port. We assume that in the initial state, a position report
has just been generated, sent and received without delay (an
over-approximation of the best-case behavior for the preced-
ing message).
We used the tool chains to estimate the probability p that
the communication succeeds before time t, for different val-
ues of t. Table 1 gives the estimates for the three combina-
tions of tools we have used. We can see that the three tool
combinations produce (approximately) the same results.
t ProVer ProVer MoDeST
+ python + python
5 sec 0 0 0
10 sec 0.98267±9 0.98271± 6 0.9840
15 sec 0.999700±9 0.999688± 8 0.9997
20 sec 0.9999944±6 0.9999950±10 0.9999
Table 1: Experiment 1 results: Probability that
communication succeeds before the indicated time t
We can see that for t = 15 seconds, the estimated commu-
nication reliability is large enough. As this is an estimate,
the actual value may be just below the desired 99.95 %, but
Sender Receiver
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ReceiverSender’
Figure 6: Model for the second experiment
ProVer can help us out here. We have used the tool to
check the statement: “The probability that the message is
received within 15 seconds is ≥ 0.9995”, stated as a formula
in the input language of ProVer. ProVer then affirmed
that the statement is true with a confidence > 0.9999.
4.3 Second Experiment: Delay Probability
Even if a single communication is reliable enough, it may
happen too often that communications get disrupted during
a longer trip. To check for this, we have constructed a model
consisting of two successive trains running at 300 km/h.
The leading train sends a position and integrity report to
the RBC, which in turn sends a movement authority to the
following train, as illustrated in figure 6. The second train
should receive a movement authority within a short time af-
ter a position report is generated, to avoid that it needs to
brake. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure (using our
tools) the age of the information on which the movement
authority received is based. Therefore, we measure the time
between two successive receptions of a movement authority.
A simple calculation (based on the fact that the communi-
cation channels have bounded capacity, and that a newer
message overwrites an older one) shows that if two recep-
tions lie away ∆t seconds, the latter is based on information
not older than ∆t+7.4 seconds. So, in addition to the min-
imal headway for instant communication (40 seconds), we
allow for another 7.4 seconds headway based on the analysis
method. Therefore, we have chosen to analyze the situa-
tion where the headway between two trains is 62.4 seconds.
What is the probability that the following train has to brake
during this trip? So, what is the probability p that the time
∆t between two successive movement authorities received
by the following train is more than 15 seconds at least once?
Further, what is the probability that it has to stop? (At
300 km/h, a train needs about one minute to stop.) So,
what is the probability p that ∆t > 15 + 60 seconds at least
once? ProVer and MoDeST provide us with the results
shown in table 2.
max ∆t ProVer ProVer MoDeST
+ python + python
≤ 5 sec 0 0 0
≤ 10 sec 0.0438± 9 0.0449±13 0.0662±16
≤ 15 sec 0.899± 2 0.8994± 9 0.9216±18
≤ 20 sec 0.9964± 4 0.9959± 4 0.9977± 3
≤ 25 sec 0.99966±11 0.99971±11 0.99996± 4
≤ 75 sec 1 1 1
Table 2: Experiment 2 results: Probability that ∆t
is always ≤ the indicated time during a 1 hour trip
We can see that according to both tools, about one train
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out of 9 or 10 would have to brake. The simulations did not
produce a single run where a train would need to stop, so
this probability is too small to be measured.
The numbers obtained via the three evaluation methods
are reasonably close to each other. This indicates that the
translation of these StoCharts to MoDeST is faithful.
Earlier in the process, the ProVer + python analysis also
served as a kind of quantitative debugging tool: if significant
differences were detected between ProVer’s genuine anal-
ysis and the python scripts, this was a strong indication of
an error in the scripts.
4.4 Experiment Series: Parametric Analysis
The power of our MoDeST translation does not only lie
in its mechanizability. The simple fact that Mo¨bius is a
well-designed and well-supported modelling and analysis en-
vironment pays off. We can use the parametric analysis fa-
cilities provided by Mo¨bius to carry out an in-depth study
of the vulnerabilities of the ETCS case in a convenient way,
using the experiment series support of Mo¨bius. We have
varied the second experiment and checked the influence of
the following four parameters on the required headway:
Train speed. The trains in the above experiments ran at
300 km/h. ETCS should also be able to handle trains
running at 400 or 500 km/h. (Please note that the
train speed also influences the minimal headway for
instant communication, which was 40 seconds in the
original experiment.)
Delay between position reports. The specification requires
that a train sends a position report at most once in
5 seconds. We also analyse the situation where the
actual frequency is lower (once in 10 or 30 seconds).
Connection loss probability. The specification requires
that a connection loss has a probability ≤ 10−4 per
hour. However, some network operators are only will-
ing to guarantee a lower quality, so we also checked
the probabilities 10−3 and 10−3.5 per hour.
Cell size. We have assumed that a cell has, on average,
7 km diameter. Other sources propose other sizes, so
we checked cell sizes 2 km, 6 km, and 10 km.
There are in total 81 possible combinations of parameters.
Mo¨bius could be instructed to generate sets of runs (for
python) with one simple command. We have compared the
outcomes of the 81 experiments and conclude the following:
• The connection loss probability has almost no influ-
ence. In a few experiments, we find differences of up
to 0.5 percentage points.
• Increasing the delay between position reports leads, more
or less, to a proportional increase of max ∆t.
• The cell size and train speed are highly related. The
reason is that they both influence the expected delay
between cell handovers in a similar way. Higher speeds
and smaller cells lead to more frequent cell handovers,
which may lead to more missed communications.
For example, assuming a connection loss probability
of 10−3 per hour and a delay between position reports
of 5 seconds, we get the values for the probability that
max ∆t ≤ 15 sec in Table 3:
Train speed
Cell size 300 km/h 400 km/h 500 km/h
2 km 0.742 0.581 0.413
6 km 0.956 0.927 0.901
10 km 0.977 0.963 0.956
Table 3: Experiment series results: Probability that
∆t is always ≤ 15 sec
Figure 7: Comparison of two cumulative distribu-
tion functions for max ∆t
The python analysis of an experiment can also be illus-
trated by a cumulative distribution function that shows the
probability that max ∆t is at most a given value. In fig-
ure 7, the solid line is the cumulative distribution function
for the experiment with cell size 10 km, and the dotted line
is the cdf for the experiment with cell size 2 km. In both
experiments, the delay between position reports was 5 sec,
the connection loss probability was 10−3/h, and the train
speed was 300 km/h. The cdfs are discontinuous because
the GSM-R transmission delay is modeled by a discontinu-
ous cdf (see figure 2). It reflects that we have modelled the
the worst-case assumptions provided according to the GSM-
R specification, and the discontinuities in the assumptions
propagate to the guarantees provided by the ETCS system.
If the service actually provided by GSM-R is better (e. g. as
indicated by the dotted line in figure 2), then the resulting
service of the system will be better, leading to some plot
(to the left and) above the one shown in figure 7. Owed to
our design-by-contract approach, the resulting performance
is guaranteed to be bounded by the plot, as long as the input
distribution satisfies the contractual assumptions.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has elaborated on our efforts to define a trans-
lational semantics for StoCharts. The semantics maps
a collection of StoCharts to the MoDeST language. It
enables mechanization of the stochastic analysis of Sto-
Charts, because MoDeST is connected to the discrete event
simulation engine of the Mo¨bius toolset. Our efforts have
focused on the translation of a recent StoChart case study,
modeling GSM-based communication in future European
high speed trains. The simulation results produced by the
tools ProVer and Mo¨bius only show insignificant differ-
ences, which can be seen as a sanity-check for our work.
We have used the parametric analysis features of Mo¨bius
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to dive deeper into the different aspects of the ETCS case
study. In particular, our design-by-contract approach al-
lows us to distill bounds on the reliability of the ETCS case,
instead of performing a case-by-case analysis.
The translational semantics reflects the hierarchical struc-
ture of a StoChart and covers all interesting aspects of
StoCharts, including a few challenging issues. In particu-
lar, we have identified that the exception handling mecha-
nism particular to MoDeST can be used to effectively model
border-crossing transitions. Based on the insight gained in
this paper, we will strive for a complete compositional trans-
lation from StoChart to MoDeST.
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